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In this article, I will discuss the connections between narrativity, embodiment 
and relationality in the practise of doctoring and nursing. In particular, I will 
elucidate these connections by discussing the patient chart as a diagnostic tool 
that also determines the kind of relationship the doctor or nurse adopts vis-à-vis 
the patient and thus what kind of embodiment becomes the subject of 
examination. This becomes a way to seek the ill body; the body to which 
medicine devotes its care. The perspective is derived primarily from 
contemporary philosophy, the history of ideas and the medical humanities. The 
task of the article is critical in the sense that I aim to analyse the connections 
mentioned to shed light on their historical and philosophical foundations and 
thus be able to suggest possible alternatives to accepted practice. I will begin by 
discussing the narrative basis of diagnosis and showing the philosophical 
differences between the inanimate body and the lived body. I will thereafter 
discuss what may be called ‘bodily absence’ before returning to the patient chart 
and how the chart can stage various connections between narrativity, 
embodiment and relationality in doctoring and nursing. 
 
 
The narrative basis of diagnosis 
 
As this article was being written (the summer of 2010), the staff at Kungälv 
Hospital near Gothenburg were working with a project aimed at changing the 
rounds system in the wards with focus on creating a patient-centred, 
interprofessional method.1 In connection with this, the hospital will be 
remodelling the wards based on the shared method and attempting to devise a 
model for shared documentation in the patient chart. The goal of this 
documentation is for assistant nurses, RNs and doctors to jointly write 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See the internal document Andra ronden: Nya väg(g)ar till ett patientcentrerat 
avdelningsarbete, 7 November 2008. 
admission notes and round notes. The problem with the current system, to put it 
simply, is that doctors only have to follow the patient’s medical history and 
what other doctors have written about this history, while nurses need only to 
follow the nursing care given to a particular patient.2 Owing to the options 
provided by the modern, digital method of charting, neither doctors nor nurses 
need to read what the other profession has written about the patient’s condition. 
With a click of the mouse, they can hide the information they are not interested 
in. The results of a medical examination and various tests may thus be separated 
from a more general perspective on the patient’s social history and the 
description of the habits that affect his or her health. If the purpose of a chart is 
to serve as a basis for care planning, such a system entails risk that important 
aspects of the patient’s health will be lost in the gap between that defined as 
doctoring and that defined as nursing. At Kungälv Hospital, they describe this 
separation as a separation of ‘body’ and ‘mind’. Where doctors take care of the 
body as an object explored through the medical sciences, nurses take care of the 
mind, meaning the personal and social aspects of human existence – in 
philosophical terms, our subjectivity and intersubjectivity. 
 This brief example illustrates a profound dichotomy in modern 
society that has a number of practical consequences. In relation to doctoring and 
nursing, it results in specialisation, wherein various aspects of human existence 
are regarded in isolation and thus the patient may be described as an arm or a leg 
or a heart, rather than a human individual with a unique history. On the 
caregiver’s side of the equation, this metonymic talk about the patient – where a 
body part represents the entire person – corresponds to the specialist skills of 
doctors and nurses. There is often strong justification for such specialisation, in 
that a specialist should be able to provide the best and most precisely targeted 
treatment to the patient seeking care. Specialisation has burgeoned in pace with 
progress in scientific medicine and few people are distrustful of this progress. 
Still, we must not forget that one prominent justification for specialisation in 
modern societies has nothing to do with excellence, but rather with instrumental 
efficiency, where more patients seen per hour seems to mean more care for the 
money – but not necessarily better care. The reasons underlying this 
specialisation may be good or bad, but both carry a risk of exacerbating the 
fragmentation of the patient, where treatment of a particular illness is not related 
to the patient’s more general physical, mental and social history.  
Rita Charon, professor of clinical medicine at Columbia University, 
describes this specialisation as a ‘reification of health’ and emphasises that 
‘sicknesses declare themselves over time, not in one visit to the consultant’.3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I refer here mainly to doctors and nurses. This picture of contemporary healthcare can of 
course be made more complex by including other professional groups and perspectives – both 
physical and psychological – that have become prevalent in healthcare. 
3 Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness. Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 7. 
Charon suggests what she calls ‘narrative medicine’ as a remedy for such 
fragmentation. What narrative medicine can do is bridge the divides prevalent in 
medical care today: between the giver and the receiver of care, between the 
medical diagnoses of what kind of illness has affected the patient and the 
patient’s own experience of illness, etc. Medicine, according to Charon, 
inevitably has a narrative component that seeks to tell a story about how the 
patient became ill, what kind of illness has affected the patient and what kind of 
restoration of health is possible – and how. Medical care can thus be analysed as 
a narrative with a plot that is revealed in a patient chart – which is a type of 
literary genre, although it differs from other types of literature in that its primary 
purpose is descriptive rather than reflective. As Charon describes it, ‘clinical 
practice is consumed with emplotment. Diagnosis itself is the effort to impose a 
plot onto seemingly disconnected events or states of affairs’.4 The main purpose 
of the chart is to shape a structure based on the results of clinical examinations, 
the doctor’s observations and the patient’s own account of his or her sufferings – 
a structure that makes the patient’s condition comprehensible and thus treatable. 
 A medical diagnosis is, in other words, an interpretive act and just as 
every good novel is open to many interpretations, but not any and all 
interpretations, the patient’s condition may also be open to multiple 
interpretations. Not all of them will be productive, but determining the one that 
is the most productive is probably up to the doctor or nurse who has good 
judgement, schooled in medical research and clinical experience.5 Some kinds of 
illness are more easily interpreted that others, but the habit of interpreting 
certain symptoms as obvious indicators of a certain illness may cloud the 
understanding that this time – in the hundredth case – it something entirely 
different. In other words, critical vigilance over one’s own interpretation process 
is an element of good judgement. This is a matter of interpretive skill, which 
constitutes an intersection between the medical sciences and the humanities 
disciplines such as comparative literature, philosophy and theology. In one 
sense, the latter may be defined as exercises in and reflections on the art of 
interpretation, but medical diagnosis may also and opportunely be described as 
an act of interpretation and thus something upon which these humanities 
disciplines can shed light. To once again quote Charon, ‘What literary studies 
give medicine is the realisation that our intimate medical relationships occur in 
words’.6 And words are never innocent, not even in a patient chart. This is 
evident in that how a patient is described in a chart by necessity conveys a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Op. cit., p. 50. Contemporary examples of similar perspectives are found in, for example, 
physician and journalist Lisa Sander’s book Every Patient Tells a Story: Medical Mysteries 
and the Art of Diagnosis. New York: Broadway Books, 2009, and novelist Siri Hustvedt’s 
book The Shaking Woman or A History of My Nerves. New York: Henry Holt and Company 
LLC, 2009. 
5 See Jerome Groopman, How Doctors Think. Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007. 
6 Rita Charon, op. cit., p. 53. 
particular attitude towards the patient. Various charting methods thus 
communicate various attitudes towards the patient, not least among them how 
the chart understands the patient’s body. This argument on the narrative basis of 
diagnosis thus leads us to the matter of the ill body. 
 
 
The inanimate body and the lived body 
 
What body does medicine study? What is the ill body? The very possibility of 
asking such questions in a meaningful way is predicated upon the body’s 
capacity to manifest itself in myriad ways, or perhaps upon that our view of or 
interest in the body allows various dimensions of our embodiment to become 
apparent to us. A relatively simple distinction between various perspectives on 
the body is brought to the fore by the philosophical tradition of phenomenology 
in its distinction, as made by German philosopher Edmund Husserl, between the 
body as lifeless physical object (Körper) and the Body as living and animate 
(Leib).7 The latter conceptualisation of the Body means that the body is not 
primarily an object, but rather constitutes our relationship to the world we 
constantly live in and experience. The Body becomes an instrument of 
communication and the perception of embodiment an experience of participation 
in the world rather than separation between self and world. Take for example the 
experience of reaching for a coffee cup with one hand. The hand is not merely a 
thing that my ‘self’ somehow steers towards the coffee cup. My embodiment in 
this case is, rather than a thing, a particular way of being in the world, where all 
my bodily attention (if I am not reaching as an act of pure distraction) is directed 
at the object of my desire rather than the body as such. Certainly, my hand can 
become an object when my attention is shifted from the cup to the hand (‘What 
is that odd spot on the back of my hand?’), but such an experience actually 
clarifies the paradoxical and intriguing human ability to be at once the object 
and subject of experience – as when I use the fingers of one hand to move the 
other. 
Awareness of my embodiment in this sense cannot be reduced to 
awareness of an object that may, in theory, be expected to remain the same over 
time; it is empirical knowledge in the genuine sense, where my perceptions of 
being (and not merely owning) a body are communicated over time. Talking 
about the body as an inanimate physical object – as Körper rather than Leib in 
Husserl’s terminology – thus becomes a kind of abstraction that selects certain 
aspects of my experience of my own embodiment and omits others. The body as 
lived and animate cannot be examined independently of how I physically 
experience the world, while the body as inanimate physical object becomes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a more detailed discussion of phenomenological concepts of the body including 
references, see my book Heavenly Bodies: Incarnation, Gaze, Embodiment. Translation: Carl 
Olson. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, forthcoming. 
something separate from the self. Philosopher Stephen Crites argues therefore 
that narrative is the proper form for examining lived embodiment: ‘Neither 
disembodied minds nor mindless bodies can appear in stories. There the self is 
given whole, as an activity in time’.8 How we choose to talk about the body thus 
determines which dimensions of our embodiment become manifest at the 
moment. It is thus not only the doctor who reduces my bodily existence to the 
knee she is happens to be about to operate on; I can also become a knee to 
myself when the knee is demanding my attention. Unlike the doctor, who moves 
on to the next knee when she is finished with mine, my attention usually 
wanders between different parts of my body or, at least as often, outside my own 
body. 
 It may therefore be accurate to say that the patient chart 
differentiates between body and mind, provided we understand that this involves 
an attempt both to separate and to hold together. On the one hand, there is a 
conscious desire to separate insofar as the clinical observations are intended to 
winnow out a medically significant detail in the process of the organism so that 
the outcome of an appropriate intervention can be predicted. There is an 
endeavour here to ignore what may seem – albeit for the moment – medically 
insignificant in order to sharpen the focus on what seems to be the cause of an 
illness. As I will return to soon, this is consistent with customary scientific 
method: to reduce as many factors as possible in order to better predict the 
outcome. On the other hand, the chart is also an expression of a desire to hold 
together, in the sense that the medically significant details are seldom or never 
entirely independent of either the actual course of the illness (the time aspect) or 
the patient as a single biological organism rather than numerous cooperating but 
independent organisms – or of the patient’s ‘general condition’ (including her 
personality) beyond the purely biological. The emphasis I have placed above, 
with Charon’s assistance, on the narrative dimensions of the patient chart has to 
do with these particular aspects; the reduction of the patient to a physical body 
(or body part) is inadequate to understand the human experience of being a 
physical being. When we reduce our embodiment to the physical body, 
dimensions of our state of illness and our state of health are lost. 
 That this reduction often occurs is not particularly surprising though. 
Modern medical science – including many of its advances – is based precisely 
upon such a reduction. Rather than tracing back to a Classical philosophical or 
theological influence and the propounded dualism between body and mind, we 
instead find it at the gates of modern history. German medical historian Klaus 
Bergdolt argues that the sharp distinction between body and mind made by 
French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) was ‘an event of enormous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Stephen Crites, ‘The Narrative Quality of Experience’, Why Narrative? Readings in 
Narrative Theology. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (eds). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1989, p. 85. 
consequence for European theories of health’.9 Descartes viewed the body as an 
‘extended thing’ (res extensa) that could be likened to a machine and studied 
through mathematics and geometry, while the soul (or mind/consciousness, as 
we would say today) was a ‘thinking thing’ (res cogitans) that was independent 
of the body and was the human being’s actual self. Consciousness was 
autonomous, the body purely material. Where the body was previously seen as a 
mirror image of the greater cosmos, Descartes considers it comparable to a 
mechanical automaton. Philosopher and physician Drew Leder thus says, in 
reference to Cartesian philosophy, that ‘the living body is not fundamentally 
different from the lifeless; it is a kind of animated corpse, a functioning 
mechanism’.10 The mechanical understanding of the body originated by 
Descartes has, as Bergdolt has pointed out, played a critical role in the history of 
ideas, not least due to medical progress. When the body was represented as a 
mechanical automaton, it also became accessible to study the body in another 
way, in that it could be measured. As Bergdolt says, ‘The healthy body seemed 
to have no secrets to hide; the unknown was regarded as the not yet known’.11 
And so certain groups of doctors began to apply Cartesian theories to concrete 
medical problems by measuring the body’s pulse, temperature and perspiration 
in an attempt to systematise medical knowledge. They polemicised against the 
old Aristotelian and Galenic medicine and advocated state-organised public 
health care.  
 Consequent upon the mechanisation of the body and the 
accompanying quantifiability of health, physical health was isolated from and 
understood independently from other kinds of health, which brought about an 
epoch-making transformation of the understanding of embodiment and health 
alike. A more complete breakthrough of mechanically understood embodiment 
and the intimately related notion of health as quantifiable did not occur until the 
19th century. Physical health unmistakably became part of the social 
differentiation process of modernity: economics, politics, religion and science 
are presumed to belong to different and distinct spheres, each of which heeds its 
own laws rather than being gathered under the same mantle. And so doctors 
become specialists in their own field, medical science, but are presumed (in 
theory) not to possess any particular skill in other spheres. A metaphorical 
superimposition of the individual body and the social body simultaneously 
occurs, in which the latter could also be described as a mechanical body and 
protected by the state as a defence against disease, most notably by English 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Social welfare and health comprised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Klaus Bergdolt, Wellbeing: A Cultural History of Healthful Living. Translation: Jane 
Dewhurst. Polity Press. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, p. 202. 
10 Drew Leder, ‘A Tale of Two Bodies: The Cartesian Corpse and the Lived Body’, Body and 
Flesh: A Philosophical Reader. Donn Welton (ed.). Malden/Oxford: Blackwells, 1998, p. 
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11 Klaus Bergdolt, op, cit., p. 204. 
– then as now – a political agenda. But we can also follow the cultural 
transformation of various illnesses and notions about health on another level; 
with regard for instance to how historical notions about melancholia, supported 
by a wealth of empirical knowledge, have been pathologised in our time, 
becoming the clinically diagnosable – but experientially that much poorer – 
disorder of depression.12 The striking thing about this evolution is that there 
seems to be a constant tug-of-war between the endeavour to distinctly separate 
what belongs to the body and what belongs to the mind, and a movement that 
forever crosses and re-crosses the boundaries of these alternatives when illnesses 
are used to describe social conditions or melancholia is used to describe an 
entire culture. If phenomenological objections to the reduction of human 
embodiment to a physical mechanism are justified, this tug-of-war is hardly 
surprising; the reduction of embodiment to an inanimate mechanism is simply 
unable to do justice to our experiences of being physical beings.  
 
Bodily absence 
 
The development I outlined above and which led to separation of the body as 
object and the lived body – or between ‘body’ and ‘mind’ – is often presented as 
a conundrum. One of the problems this separation is thought to lead to concerns 
how the caregiver relates to the patient: as a person with a will of his or her own 
or as passive object of medical and nursing care. One of the risks of the latter 
attitude may be that caregivers become guilty of a variant of what physician 
Jerome Groopman calls ‘confirmation bias’, seeing the patient’s symptoms as an 
indication of the statistically most likely illness and thus overlooking the aspects 
of the patient’s personal life history that might make the case unique.13 But 
describing the development of modern medicine in this respect, in a more or less 
cut-and-dried manner, as a story of decline also entails a risk of conveying an 
oversimplified picture of the complex relationship between caregiver and patient 
and obscuring some of the reasons Descartes and the medical tradition that 
followed him came to regard the body as an object. Let me therefore unpack a 
dimension of human embodiment of profound significance, especially to the 
relationship of doctoring and nursing to this. 
 In The Absent Body, Drew Leder draws attention to what he calls 
‘bodily absence’.14 Bodily absence is a multidimensional phenomenon, but one 
of the phenomena that Leder notes in his book – and which few modern 
philosophers have discussed in any depth – is how several of our most vital 
bodily functions – breathing, blood circulation, digestion and, not least of all, 
sleep among them – must be understood as impersonal and thus more or less 	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14 Drew Leder, The Absent Body. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
beyond our conscious horizon. Unlike the external organ that can be used for a 
variety of things – the mouth can talk, sing, whistle, spit – the movements of the 
internal organs are predetermined. I do not need to form any conscious intention 
to continue the repetitive act of breathing; on the contrary, if I begin to pay 
attention to how it works, my breathing is more likely to be disturbed. As well, 
if I had to think consciously about breathing, it would leave precious little time 
to perform other actions. Most of our most vital bodily functions are therefore – 
as luck would have it – impersonal, inaccessible to introspection and more or 
less automatic. 
The interesting thing about these functions is that we are reminded 
of them primarily through some kind of disruption: I am not breathing right; I 
am having a hard time digesting my food or sleeping. Disruption of these 
impersonal functions is a common reason for seeking medical attention. Leder 
emphasises that it is such experiences of the absence of the body – in this case 
the absence of experience of the body – that makes Cartesian mind/body 
dualism seem empirically credible; universal human experiences like pain, 
pregnancy, or age may be experienced as that the self is something separated 
from the body that is alien to the self, which is in some way holding me captive. 
I am reminded of my embodiment primarily in the experience of my internal 
alienation from the same; we say that health is silent and the same applies to the 
well body. Moreover, experiences of bodily presence and bodily absence are 
rarely distinct experiences; I am reminded of my embodiment when I am ill 
precisely because I experience a biological process that is beyond my voluntary 
control. It therefore becomes relevant to talk about more complex experiences of 
present absence or absent presence that show the tension of our relationship to 
our embodiment. To do justice to human experiences of the body, a philosophy 
of the body must be broad enough to also account for experiences of bodily 
absence (even in their more complex versions). If science and medicine have 
largely entailed a third-person perspective on the body and have thus reduced 
our embodiment to an object, such a perspective has in so doing nonetheless 
been able to illuminate dimensions of our embodiment that are quite simply 
inaccessible from a first-person perspective.15 
These internal processes and functions that are essentially 
inaccessible to our direct, conscious intention are thus not entirely independent 
of our conscious functions. There is, as said, an interplay between bodily 
absence and bodily presence that can be illustrated with a few simple examples. 
On the one hand, it is clear that our conscious intentions can be affected by 
internal functions, such as when poor digestion puts us in a bad mood. Our 
overall perceptions of a certain situation may be tinged by what is going on 
inside of us, inaccessible to our direct intention. On the other hand, it is also true 
that we can affect our internal processes. Regular exercise, we are told, 	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strengthens the heart muscle and counteracts stiffness in the joints and muscles. 
I can thus, through my lifestyle, affect these internal processes, which is 
indirectly confirmed by how dietetics – not only in terms of diet but more 
generally as a position-taking – has been closely associated with medicine into 
modern times.16  
Similar examples can be multiplied and deepened, but let me instead 
briefly argue that one conclusion of this becomes that the bodily presence and 
bodily absence overlap and cannot be identified or picked apart. The 
overlapping of internal and external functions, but also the body as thing along 
with the body as existential project seem to constitute a basic structure for our 
embodied existence as human beings. I talk about this as an overlap rather than 
an identification or distinction deliberately, based primarily on French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s use of the rhetorical term ‘chiasm’, 
thus a ‘crossing-over’ or perhaps a ‘reversal’ to avoid using immediately 
contrastive terms to illustrate this phenomenon.17  Our internal and external 
bodily functions cooperate, but that does not mean they can identify with each 
either, any more than the body should be understood as a contrast to mind or 
consciousness. Such overlaps, or chiasms, can be identified at several levels of 
human existence. And so Leder, for instance, argues that the desire to separate 
the physical body from our existential engagement is to draw a false distinction: 
‘in the lived body, the physical and existential always intertwine’.18 This 
‘intertwining’ does not, as I have noted, necessarily manifest as an obviously 
harmonious relationship between physical and existential, which is why I prefer 
the term ‘overlap’ as more expressive of tension. But this uncovers one of the 
reasons that reduction of the human body to an inanimate object discards 
important aspects of our embodiment: it obscures the complexity of the person, 
as biological organism and as existential being.  
Translated to the practise of doctoring and nursing, criticism of 
Cartesian dualism need not entail a rejection of the insights achieved by modern 
medical research, nor the need in certain situations to study the body as an 
object of medical examination. To use a trivial example: if I arrive at Accident 
& Emergency with a broken leg, I might not be particularly interested in 
knowing that the A&E doctor emphasises in her practise that the physical and 
the existential always overlap and therefore wants to get to know me as a person 
before treatment begins. In this situation, I would most likely be happy to be 
reduced to a leg so that treatment with painkillers can start as soon as possible. 
But in the face of diagnoses that are less straightforward than a broken leg (and 
perhaps even in connection with this seemingly simple one – before it has been 	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urval. Translation: Anna Petronella Fredlund. Stockholm/Stehag: Brutus Östlings bokförlag 
Symposion, 2004. 
18 Drew Leder, op. cit., p. 44. 
confirmed), it may be relevant to consider aspects other than the purely physical. 
Apropos the doctor’s diagnosis, Groopman establishes the need to be able to 
both objectify and thus ignore the patient as a person and to acknowledge the 
patient as a person: ‘We face a paradox: feeling prevents us from being blind to 
our patient’s soul but risks blinding us to what is wrong with him’.19 Problems 
arise when this tension cannot be maintained without the depersonalised 
objective body – in a nutshell: the Cartesian corpse – must constitute the model 
of human embodiment in general. In Leder’s words: ‘When the patient is not 
treated as living, desiring, suffering being, compliance is reduced, evidence is 
overlooked, inappropriate treatments are prescribed, genuine healing gives way 
to “fixing the machine”’.20 The solution is then not found in allowing the tension 
to slacken in the other direction, so that the first-person perspective reigns 
supreme, but precisely in maintaining the tension between these two 
perspectives in the art of medicine, for they are, as I recounted above, rooted in 
the paradoxical structure of human embodiment. A good patient chart whose 
aim is the best interests of the patient should probably reflect the very 
complexity of embodiment in some fashion.  
 
 
One reader, two stories 
 
Let us finally return to the relationship between the chart and the ill body of the 
patient. What I first want to establish based on the arguments presented thus far 
is that patient charts and embodiment are inextricably bound in the trinity of 
narrativity, relationality and embodiment that is the main focus of this article. 
This means that in a particular form, the chart can promote the separation of 
aspects of human existence that should remain together, while the chart in 
another form may promote affinity.  
As I recounted in the introduction, the patient chart can easily 
become an instrument of separation. The body is treated by the doctor as an 
inanimate object, while the nurse must devote himself to the living person. I 
suspect that in general neither of these caregivers could manage without an 
approach that to some extent also considers factors other than those included in 
their own specialities. At the same time, it is hardly inconceivable that the chase 
after efficiency gains in the modern hospital institution reinforces a separation of 
body and mind or inanimate object from living person. When I, somewhat 
schematically, have talked about doctors and nurses as different skills that I have 
called doctoring and nursing, it is important to say that these discrete skills are 
not primarily reproduced by individuals and that a less productive relationship to 
the patient’s embodiment might thus constitute an attitude problem. The truth is 	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instead that such divisions are ‘bred-in-the-bone’, reproduced by the very social 
institution comprising medical education and research, hospitals, primary care 
centres and so on. If these divisions entail a separation, not only of the patient as 
physical body from the patient as living person, but also of doctors from nurses 
and doctoring from nursing, this can present a barrier to making it possible for 
the patient to receive optimal care because the tension that resides both in 
human embodiment and the relationship of medicine to the same ceases to be a 
tension and becomes a dichotomy: a splitting of two mutually exclusive parts.21 
Standardised templates in patient charts can inhibit the prerequisites for asking 
the patient open-ended questions and thus ignoring anything that does not fit.22 
 But the chart – which can at once be the result of an institutional 
dichotimisation and an inherent reproduction of the dichotomy – also holds, at 
least potentially, other resources. The chart writes the story of the patient’s 
illness, which follows the patient over time and contains observations of several 
types – based on both doctoring and nursing – and thus provides a more 
comprehensive picture of the patient in question. In some types of charts, 
probably such that belonged to family doctors in private practice in an era that 
only recently passed into memory, the description of the patient may be 
expanded to touch upon matters beyond the strictly medical and nursing account 
and thus approach a kind of rudimentary biography.23 Charon argues that in our 
time, health care professionals often replace the confessors or spiritual advisors 
of former times and might be among the few trained confidantes available to 
individuals in ordinary life.24 Even if the chart is not of the more exhaustive 
type, and even if it lacks the authorial ‘I’ that characterises more literary or 
autobiographical stories, it is at least inclined towards an understanding of 
human embodiment that goes beyond the physical object. With the quotation of 
Crites above, I submit that disembodied minds or mindless bodies can hardly be 
the subject of a story, for a story depicts a lived body.25 Such a body is always 
unique because it belongs to a living person with a history of his or her own. A 
chart that retells at least part of a patient’s story is thus conceived in the overlap 
between the ambitions of scientific medicine to find the generalisable elements 
of certain symptoms of disease that make it possible to arrive at a particular 
diagnosis and prescribe a treatment, and the unique patient’s non-generalisable 
story. The point of recounting these unique elements is not, or at least not only, 	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to respect the patient’s subjectivity, but that this life story may also contribute 
insights that are relevant to the care actually given. As an example, Groopman 
mentions how a doctor used the patient’s biography to help a woman who had 
been repeatedly admitted to a hospital in Boston and was now in heart failure: 
the doctor realised that as an African-American woman who grew up in 
Mississippi in the 1930s, it was highly likely that the patient had never learned 
to read or write. And so it proved that she could not take her medications 
correctly because she was unable to read the labels on the medicine bottles.26 
Similar examples of how upbringing, family, religion and culture affect the 
success of caring treatment – and what constitutes success in general – can be 
replicated, but also regarding more personal factors such as shame, guilt and 
fear. 
 One way of emphasising the importance of seeing the lived body, 
and not only the body as physical object, is to talk about the need for a more 
‘holistic’ perspective. Although such a holistic perspective may be a justifiable 
reaction to reductive theories and practices, I am not entirely satisfied with such 
a descriptor because it, too, can obscure the tensions and paradoxes 
characterising human embodiment that I have chosen to bring to the fore here. A 
holistic or whole-system perspective may lead to thoughts of an organic whole 
in which everything works together smoothly, but as we have seen above, there 
is reason to distinguish various aspects of human embodiment without requiring 
their utter separation or construal as contrasts. In line with the more complex 
perspective I am advocating here, Charon suggests that ‘Illness occasions the 
telling of two tales of self at once, one told by the “person” of the self and the 
other told by the body of the self’.27 Even though Charon is not discussing 
patient charts in this context, I believe this is also a fair model for what we 
should be able to expect from a chart. It is important that medical professionals 
are able to listen to or read these two tales simultaneously, the patient’s own 
story of his or her symptoms and illness put into the context of his or her greater 
life story, as well as the story that the caring sciences have trained caregivers to 
listen to: the impersonal but crucial bodily functions that work for the most part 
in silence, unseen and unnoticed, when the body is functioning it should, but 
come out of the woodwork in the ill or aged body. When it comes to the latter 
tale, the care professions, by virtue of their training and experience, are gifted 
with literacy possessed by few laymen, but that does not mean they cannot make 
themselves illiterate in relation to the first-mentioned, more personal life story; 
there is reason for professionals to reflect about how they can build their skills 
in relation to this – a kind of reflection that is found in literary studies, 
philosophy, theology and other humanities, which is not to say that they apply 
this reflection with any regularity to the care sciences. For the sake of good 	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judgement, the doctor or the nurse must be able to integrate both stories without 
confusing them and able to interpret both with a high degree of skill. 
The ill body is not one body, but several. The question of how a 
chart should be structured in practice to correspond to this complexity is outside 
my area of expertise. Nevertheless, it does not seem too far a stretch to ask 
whether care should not be taken to ensure that the chart is not standardised to 
the point that it prevents doctors and nurses from approaching the patient with 
open-ended questions. I can also imagine that elements of a more discursive 
narrative in the chart would also lead to an approach that avoids reducing the 
patient’s body to an inanimate object – which, again, should not involve any 
compromise of the doctor or nurse’s medical/scientific expertise. The 
connection between narrativity, embodiment and relationality in the practice of 
doctoring and nursing would profit by a method of charting and care provision 
that in some sense reflects the complexity of the human being. The chart should 
hardly be called upon to take sole charge of this complexity; if the complexity is 
not permitted to imbue the entire health care sector, from education and research 
to practice, its chances of any general impact are slim. 
